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Abstract: Many experimental studies implement two versions of one game
for which agents’ behavior is fundamentally diﬀerent even though the Nash pre-
diction is the same. This paper provides a novel explanation of such ﬁndings.
Starting from the observation that many of the games under consideration satisfy
the strategic-complementarity property, I obtain predictions for the direction of
adjustment in response to parameter changes which do not require calculation of
the equilibrium. I show that these predictions are in line with the experimental ev-
idence. Further, I provide a behavioral justiﬁcation of the approach, and I explore
the relation to alternative explanations based on equilibrium selection theories and
the quantal response equilibrium.
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11 Introduction
L a b o r a t o r ye x p e r i m e n t sh a v ec a s td o u b to nt h ep r e d i c t i v ev a l u eo ft h eN a s h
equilibrium and its reﬁnements. At least the joint hypothesis that monetary
payoﬀs are maximized and the Nash equilibrium is played is often in conﬂict
with the facts.1 Nevertheless, in some ways the behavior of experimental sub-
jects often “looks right” intuitively. For instance, as pointed out by Samuel-
son (2005), even when point predictions do not hold, comparative-statics
predictions may still be borne out in the lab. However, even the comparative-
statics predictions derived from the Nash equilibrium often do not hold.2 For
instance, in an insightful contribution, Goeree and Holt (2001), henceforth
GH, report the results of ten pairs of experiments where the Nash equilibrium
is the same in both cases, but nevertheless subjects behave diﬀerently. Thus,
not only the point predictions are wrong, but even the comparative-statics
implication that behavior should not be aﬀected by the parameter change
fails to hold.
I shall argue that nevertheless well-known monotone comparative statics
techniques based on the Nash equilibrium can be used to explain the observed
treatment eﬀects. Results of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990)
provide comparative-statics predictions that do not rely on calculation of
the Nash equilibrium. The results can explain the treatment eﬀects in the
GH experiments and many similar observations very well, without yielding
point predictions. The argument relies on basic structural properties such as
whether the parameter shift has a monotone eﬀect on the incremental payoﬀs
from increasing actions and, similarly, whether the other players’ actions also
have such monotone eﬀects on a player’s incremental payoﬀs. By focusing on
1For instance, subjects only rely on increasing diﬀerence to a limited extent (Beard
and Beil 1994). Deviations from the Nash prediction also occur in games where social
preferences matter, including public goods games (Ledyard 1995), ultimatum games (Güth
et al. 1982) and trust games (Fehr et al. 1993).
2Samuelson himself points out the limitations of his statement, mentioning bargaining
experiments of Ochs and Roth (1989) where the eﬀects of the discount factor and the
length of the game are inconsistent with standard predictions.
2such general structural properties rather than on the speciﬁcp a y o ﬀ functions,
one can predict the direction of the treatment eﬀect while allowing for the
possibility that there is no change at all. This structural approach based on
the literature on games with strategic complementarities has so far not been
used to explain treatment eﬀects in experiments.3
I shall also compare my approach with well-known alternatives. First, I
will show that, in games with multiple parameter-independent Nash equilib-
ria the comparative-statics predictions of equilibrium selection theories such
as risk dominance and potential maximization coincide with those obtained
by the structural approach. Second, while there are similarities between the
structural approach and comparative-statics theories based on the quantal
response equilibrium of Mc Kelvey and Palfrey (1995), the former oﬀers a
simple uniﬁed approach to a wide class of related phenomena, only some of
which have been explained by the quantal response equilibrium.
In Section 2, I will sketch three of the GH examples. In Section 3, I will
use one of them to illustrate the structural approach for certain games with
strategic complementarities, namely supermodular games. In Section 4, I
will extend the approach beyond this class. Section 5 will deal with the rela-
tions between the structural approach and alternatives based on equilibrium
selection theories and on the quantal response equilibrium. Section 6 delves
deeper into the behavioral foundations of the approach. Section 7 concludes.
2 Introductory Examples
Is h a l lﬁrst sketch three of the ten GH examples.
(i) In the Kreps game, players choose actions from X1 = {0,1} and X2 =
{0,1,2,3}, respectively. Payoﬀs are given as in Table 1, where θ ∈ R+.
For all θ ∈ Θ, there are two pure Nash equilibria ((0,0) and (1,3)).I n
3A vaguely related experimental contribution of Chen and Gazzale (2004) demonstrates
that learning in certain games with strategic complementarities, namely supermodular
games, works particularly well. However, the authors do not treat comparative statics.
3x2 =0 x2 =1 x2 =2 x2 =3
x1 =0 200,50 0,45 10,30 20,−250
x1 =1 0,−250 10,−100 30,30 θ +5 0 , 6
5θ +4 0
Table 1: Kreps Game
addition, there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium where player 1 chooses x1 =0
with probability 30/31,a n d p l a y e r 2 chooses x2 =0with probability 1/21
and x2 =1with probability 20/21. Thus, the following prediction results:
“If θ increases, the equilibrium structure is not aﬀected.”
However, GH report the following results. For θ =0 , 32% of the subjects
in the role of player 1 chose the high action 1; whereas 96% did so for θ = 300.
For θ =0 , no subject in the role of player 2 chose x2 =3 , but 84% did so for
θ =3 0 0 . Thus, the experimental evidence suggests the following conclusion,
which violates the above prediction:
“As θ increases, more subjects choose high actions”.
I am interested in this particular observation of GH.4 One could of course
explain it with selection arguments, based for instance on payoﬀ dominance.
However, my goal is to ﬁnd an explanation of treatment eﬀects that also
applies to games with unique parameter-independent Nash equilibria such as
the following.
(ii) In the Traveler’s Dilemma,5 two players i =1 ,2 simultaneously choose
integers xi b e t w e e n( a n di n c l u d i n g )180 and 300. Each player is paid the min-
imum of the chosen numbers; in addition, the player with the lower number
receives a transfer R>1 from the player with the higher number.6 Deﬁning
4GH emphasize that for θ =0many subjects (68%) choose x2 =2 , the only action
that is neither part of a pure-strategy equilibrium nor of a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
5The game goes back to Basu (1994).
6The strategies are interpreted as independent claims of two travelers against an airline
that has lost the (identical) luggage of both travelers. The payoﬀ structure corresponds
to payment schemes devised by the airline to avoid excessive claims by the travelers.
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Figure 1: Traveler’s Dilemma
θ = −R,
πi (xi,x j;θ)=m i n( xi,x j)+θ · sign(xi − xj).( 1 )
The dots on the lines in Figure 1 give the reaction functions for any θ ∈
Θ =( −∞,−1).T h u s , f o r a l l θ the game has a unique Nash equilibrium
x1 = x2 =1 8 0 .7 GH examined the cases θ = −5 and θ = −180.8 For
θ = −180, 80% of the subjects chose the lowest possible action, whereas
the same fraction chose the highest possible action for θ = −5.T h u s ,a si n
the Kreps Game, parameter increases induce an increase in players’ actions,
contrary to what a comparison of Nash equilibria for the speciﬁcg a m ew o u l d
suggest.
(iii) In the common-interest proposal game (GH, Figure 3), two players
move sequentially, according to the game tree in Figure 2.9 Thus, the strategy
spaces are X1 = X2 = {0,1}. The parameter space is Θ =( 0 ,60).F o r
7This equilibrium is also the unique rationalizable strategy proﬁle.
8Similar results have been obtained by Capra et al. (1999) for other parametrizations.
9I use the name “common-interest proposal game”, because (0,0) is the optimal out-
come for both players.
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Figure 2: A Common-Interest Proposal Game
all θ ∈ Θ, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is x1 = x2 =0 .G H
considered θ =0and θ =5 8 .F o rθ =0 , 84% of the subjects in the role of
player 1 and all the subjects in the role of player 2 chose equilibrium actions
xi =0 .F o r θ =5 8 , however, the corresponding ﬁgures are only 46% and
75% respectively. Hence, higher parameter values lead to higher actions.
Summing up, the following three cases arise: (i) multiple pure-strategy
equilibria, (ii) a unique pure-strategy equilibrium, or (iii) a unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium. In all these examples, however, the set of pure-strategy
equilibria is parameter-independent, but there are nevertheless clear treat-
ment eﬀects.
3 Introducing the Structural Approach
I will now introduce the structural approach to explaining treatment eﬀects
like those in the above examples. All these games satisfy certain assumptions
that I will maintain throughout the paper. There are players i =1 ,2,s t r a t e g y
spaces Xi and payoﬀ functions πi(xi,x j,θ),w h e r eθ is from some partially
6ordered set Θ, and the following assumptions hold.10
1. Xi is independent of θ;
2. Xi is a compact subset of the real numbers;
3. Xi has a partial order ≥ that is independent of θ.11
The structural properties I will rely on to reconcile theory and evidence
concern the incremental payoﬀ from increasing actions, deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 For i =1 ,2,j6= i, xH
i >x L
i
∆i
¡
x
H
i ,x
L
i ;xj;θ
¢
≡ πi
¡
x
H
i ,x j;θ
¢
− πi
¡
x
L
i ,x j;θ
¢
.
I will use the Kreps game to illustrate the structural approach. Straight-
forward derivations show that this game has the following two properties:
∆i
¡
x
H
i ,x
L
i ;xj;θ
¢
is non-decreasing in θ (ID)
∆i
¡
x
H
i ,x
L
i ;xj;θ
¢
is non-decreasing in xj (SUP)
The ﬁrst property states that the objective functions πi (xi,x j;θ) have in-
creasing diﬀerences in (xi;θ):A ni n c r e a s ei nθ has the direct eﬀect of increas-
ing the incremental payoﬀ for each player, or at least leaving it unaﬀected.12
Thus, for ﬁxed behavior of the other player, increasing own actions becomes
(weakly) more attractive, so that reaction functions are (weakly) increas-
ing in θ.13 The second property, supermodularity of πi (xi,x j;θ) in (xi,x j),
10These assumptions can be weakened considerably. For the purposes of interpreting
the experimental evidence, the set-up is suﬃciently general.
11Typically, the required partial order on Xi will be the standard order on the real
numbers. In some cases, however, in view of the experimental evidence provided by GH
it is more natural to consider coarser partial orders.
12F o rb o t hp l a y e r s ,a ni n c r e a s ei nθ raises the beneﬁt from choosing the highest action
(x1 =1and x2 =3 ) rather than any other one, whereas there is no relation between θ
and the beneﬁt for player 2 from increasing x2 from 0 to 1 or 2,o rf r o m1 to 2.
13A formal version of this statement relies on Lemma 1 in the Appendix.
7says that the payoﬀ increase from increasing xi is non-decreasing in xj for
j 6= i.14 Thus, the optimal response of player i is non-decreasing in xj,t h a t
is, actions are strategic complements. The positive direct eﬀects of higher θ
on xi and the induced indirect eﬀects on xj are mutually reinforcing. To-
gether, (ID) and (SUP) therefore suggest that the equilibrium actions should
be non-decreasing in θ. This intuition is formalized in the following propo-
sition which is an implication of more general results from the theory of
supermodular games (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1990).
Proposition 1 Suppose (ID) and (SUP) hold. Then
(i) A smallest and a largest pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exist.
(ii) For both equilibria, the actions of each player are non-decreasing in θ.
Statement (i) not only guarantees existence of a Nash equilibrium, but
also makes sure that the smallest and largest equilibrium are well-deﬁned
objects.15 Part (ii) provides a comparative-statics prediction on these objects
that is fully in line with the empirical evidence for the Kreps Game,n a m e l y :
“If θ increases, the equilibrium actions increase or remain unaf-
fected.”
The overly strong independence prediction obtained by simple comparison
of Nash equilibria for diﬀerent parameter values is a boundary case of the
prediction of Proposition 1 that the equilibrium is non-decreasing in θ.W h i l e
the independence prediction does not survive empirical scrutiny because a
change in θ changes the observed actions, the weaker comparative-statics
prediction is consistent with the facts.
This argument illustrates the central message of the paper: By forget-
ting details of the game and focusing instead on basic structural properties,
14F o ri n s t a n c e ,f o rp l a y e r1 ,t h ei n c r e m e n t a lp a y o ﬀs increase from −200 to 10, 20 and
ﬁnally θ +3 0as player 2 increases his actions from 0 to 3.
15The smallest equilibrium exists if and only if the proﬁle consisting of the minimal equi-
librium action for each player is itself an equilibrium; similarly for the largest equilibrium.
Of course, the smallest and largest equilibrium may coincide for some or all values of θ.
8one obtains a weak comparative-statics prediction that is consistent with
the experimental evidence. I shall show that this structural approach is a
powerful tool for explaining comparative-statics puzzles in laboratory exper-
iments. Most immediately, the same logic can be applied with minor changes
to three other examples investigated by GH. The common-interest proposal
game as well as the closely related conﬂicting-interest proposal game16 and
the extended coordination game also satisfy (SUP) and (ID) with respect to
the relevant parameters and suitable partial orders. In all three cases, there
are clear treatment eﬀects, even though the equilibrium set is independent of
θ. Again, Proposition 1 provides weak comparative-statics predictions that
match the facts.17 Another application concerns public goods experiments
as surveyed by Ledyard (1995), which display clear behavioral eﬀects of the
return on investment which again cannot be captured by comparison of Nash
equilibria. The games satisfy (ID), and (SUP) holds trivially because payoﬀs
are additively separable.
The very fact that the predictions of the structural approach are consis-
tent with the experimental evidence is a strong argument in its favor. In
addition, the intuition for this observation is straightforward. Even subjects
who, for whatever reason, do not display Nash behavior, are very likely to
understand the two basic structural properties: They should understand (i)
that high incremental payoﬀs make high actions attractive for given actions
of the other player and (ii) that, if incremental payoﬀsi n c r e a s ew i t ht h eo t h e r
player’s action, then they should react to higher actions by choosing higher
actions themselves. If players understand these two properties, and if they
believe that other players apply the same reasoning, then they should choose
high actions for high parameter values.
16This game is described in Figure 4 of GH.
17Details of the arguments are available upon request.
94 Beyond Supermodular Games
This section shows how the structural approach can be extended to many
games satisfying weaker properties than (SUP) and (ID). In this fashion, the
evidence from three more GH examples can be explained.
4.1 General Games with Strategic Complementarities
It is straightforward to show that the traveler’s dilemma is not supermodular.
Nevertheless, the observed changes can be understood by reference to the
essential structural properties of the game.18
First, note that (ID) still holds. Thus, an increase in θ puts outward
pressure on the reaction functions by increasing incremental payoﬀs.19 To see
this, ﬁr s tn o t et h a t ,b e c a u s eo ft h et e r mmin(xi,x j) in the payoﬀ function,
there is an incentive to choose high actions. The term θ · sign(xi − xj) acts
as a counterbalance, but less so as θ approaches zero from below. Therefore,
the incremental payoﬀ from increasing xi is non-decreasing in θ,a n d( I D )i s
satisﬁed. Thus, even though θ has no eﬀect on the reaction function in the
speciﬁc example, it has a structural property which implies that player i’s
reaction to xj is weakly increasing in θ.20 The traveler’s dilemma corresponds
to the boundary case where the reaction functions are unaﬀected by the
parameter change even though (ID) holds.
Second, the following strategic-complementarity property holds, which is
reﬂected in Figure 2:
Both players have non-decreasing reaction functions Ri (xj;θ).( S C )
Ignoring all details of the game structure except (ID) and (SC) suggests that a
parameter increase has the direct eﬀect of increasing actions for both players,
and that these eﬀects are mutually reinforcing, so that the equilibrium should
18Similar arguments can be made for the auction game of GH.
19Lemma 1 in the Appendix provides a formal argument.
20Again, Lemma 1 in the Appendix provides the formal justiﬁcation of this argument.
10increase with θ. This intuition is correct under additional conditions which
hold in the Traveler’s Dilemma.21
Proposition 2 Suppose (SC) and (ID) hold, for each θ ∈ Θ, reaction func-
tions are well-deﬁned, and a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium (x1 (θ),x 2 (θ))
exists. Finally, suppose the following stability condition (STAB) holds:
If x1 <x 1(θ) and x2 <x 2(θ),t h e nx2 <R 2 (x1;θ) or x1 <R 1 (x2;θ);
if x1 >x 1(θ) and x2 >x 2(θ),t h e nx2 >R 2 (x1;θ) or x1 >R 1 (x2;θ).
Then xi (θ) is non-decreasing in θ for i =1 ,2.
Proof. See Appendix
(STAB) is the discrete analogue of the property that the reaction function
for player 1 is steeper than the reaction function for player 2 in (x1,x 2)-space
at the equilibrium. Clearly, (STAB) implies uniqueness of the equilibrium.
The intuition for Proposition 2 becomes clearest in a game with contin-
uous action spaces, as in Figure 3. For this game all the assumptions of
Proposition 2 hold. (ID) guarantees that, if an increase in θ aﬀects the re-
action curves, it shifts them out. By (SC) these positive eﬀects on players’
actions are mutually reinforcing. Thus, as the parameter increases from θ
L
to θ
H, both reaction curves shift outwards, resulting in a higher equilibrium.
4.2 Symmetric Games with Increasing Diﬀerences
Intuitively, general comparative-statics results require (SUP) or (SC) in ad-
dition to (ID) to make sure that indirect eﬀects do not dominate over direct
eﬀects: It is, for instance, simple to construct games with strategic substi-
tutes satisfying (ID), such that (say) player 1’s actions decrease as θ increases.
This can happen if reaction functions shift out strongly for player 2, but less
so for player 1. Then the direct eﬀect that player 1’s reaction function shifts
21I am not aware of any formal statement of this result elsewhere, but Vives (2005) hints
at the possibility of such generalizations.
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Figure 3: Comparative Statics with Continuous Action Spaces
out, inducing him to choose higher actions, will be overwhelmed by the in-
direct eﬀect that player 1 reacts to the higher action of player 2 implied
by the strong outward shift of player 2’s reaction function with a substan-
tial reduction in his own action. In symmetric settings, however, strategic
complementarity is no longer required. Though I shall not state the result
formally, it is simple to show that condition (SC) in Proposition 2 is un-
necessary as long as one considers only symmetric equilibria in symmetric
games.
4.3 Parameters Aﬀecting only one Payoﬀ Function
Even for asymmetric games that do not satisfy (SC), the structural approach
is sometimes useful. A case in point is generalized matching pennies,w i t h
Xi = {0,1} and Θ =( 4 0 ,∞).
The payoﬀs are given in Table 2. Identify a mixed strategy of player i,
σi, with the probability of choosing action 1. Figure 4 plots the reaction
correspondences for θ ∈ {44,80,320}.F o r a l l θ ∈ Θ, the reaction corre-
spondence for player 2 is given by the same dashed line R2 (σ1;θ), while it
12x2 =0 x2 =1
x1 =0 θ,40 40,80
x1 =1 40,80 80,40
Table 2: Payoﬀs in the Generalized Matching Pennies Game
depends explicitly on θ for player 1. The unique mixed-strategy equilibrium
is σ∗
1 = 1
2, σ∗
2 =1− 40
θ . Thus, unlike in the earlier examples, only player
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Figure 4: Generalized Matching Pennies
1’s equilibrium action is independent of θ:P l a y e r2’s choice x2 is increasing
in θ, as the probability with which x2 =1is played increases in θ.A s θ
increases from 44 to 80 and 320, the percentage of subjects in the role of
player 1 choosing the high action decreases from 92% to 52% and then to
4%, whereas the corresponding values for player 2 increase from 20% to 52%
and then to 84%. Thus, contrary to the prediction of the mixed-strategy
equilibrium both players’ actions change as θ does. Intuitively, as player 1’s
payoﬀ function satisﬁes (ID) with respect to (−x1,θ),22 an increase in θ di-
22This means that ∆1
¡
xH
1 ,x L
1 ;x2;θ
¢
is non-increasing in θ.
13rectly reduces his incremental beneﬁts from higher actions.23 Next, because
π2 (x2,x 1;θ) is supermodular in (x1,−x2),24 ar e d u c t i o ni nx1 from 1 to 0
has the indirect eﬀect of increasing the incremental beneﬁtf o rp l a y e r2 from
increasing x2 from 0 to 1.25 These properties suggest that, when θ increases,
player 1’s action should decrease, whereas player 2’s action should increase.
I ﬁrst prove such a comparative-statics result for games with four struc-
tural properties that hold for generalized matching pennies, but one addi-
tional requirement that obviously does not hold, namely existence of a unique
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Suppose both players have well-deﬁned reaction functions;
and there is a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium x(θ) for each θ.S u p p o s e
further that the following properties hold:
(SUP1) π1 (x1,x 2;θ) is supermodular in (x1,x 2).
(SUP
−
2 ) π2 (x2,x 1;θ) is supermodular in (x1,−x2).
(ID
−
1 ) π1 (x1,x 2;θ) satisﬁes increasing diﬀerences in (−x1,θ).
(IND2) π2 (x2,x 1;θ) is independent of θ.
Then x1(θ) is non-increasing in θ,a n dx2(θ) is non-decreasing in θ.
Proof. See Appendix
By (SUP1)a n d( S U P
−
2 ), actions are strategic complements for player
1 and strategic substitutes for player 2. Figure 5 suggests why a clear
comparative-statics result can be obtained even so. For simplicity, the ﬁgure
assumes continuous action spaces and presupposes that R1 (σ2;θ) is strictly
increasing, whereas R2 (σ1;θ) is strictly decreasing; the proof of Proposition
3 extends the argument to reaction functions that are merely non-decreasing
and non-increasing, respectively. Crucially, an increase in the parameter
aﬀects only the payoﬀs of one player, shifting his (increasing) reaction func-
tion inwards while leaving the other player’s (decreasing) reaction function
constant. Hence, the equilibrium must move to the left and upwards.
23When x2 =0 ,t h i sb e n e ﬁti s40 − θ;w h e nx2 =1 ,t h i sb e n e ﬁt is independent of θ.
24This means that ∆2
¡
xH
2 ,x L
2 ;x1;θ
¢
is non-increasing in x1.
25For x1 =1 , this incremental beneﬁti s−40,f o rx1 =0 ,i ti s40.
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Figure 5: Understanding Generalized Matching Pennies
Even though generalized matching pennies only has a mixed-strategy
equilibrium, the result applies. The mixed-strategy equilibrium can be shown
to be the pure-strategy equilibrium of a game satisfying the assumptions of
Proposition 3. This game has strategy space
P
i =[ 0 ,1], corresponding to
the set of probability distributions on Xi;p a y o ﬀs correspond to the expected
payoﬀs of the original game. Hence, again, comparative-statics follow from
basic structural properties.
Summing up, the structural approach underlying Propositions 1-3 relies
on the following ingredients: First, players are able to abstract. Second, they
use this ability to identify basic structural properties of the game. Third, they
behave as theory suggests for games with certain basic properties rather than
for the particular speciﬁcation.
Table 3 summarizes the examples discussed so far and provides some
additional results that will be introduced below. As reﬂected in the table,
the structural approach can explain the evidence in seven of the ten examples
provided by GH. In the remaining three cases, the structural approach does
not provide a false prediction. It is simply not applicable because the games
do not have suitable structural properties. Loosely speaking, the direct and
15Nash Prediction Game Observed Actions Reason
Unique pure Nash Traveler’s dilemma Increasing in θ Prop. 2
equilibrium (Capra et al. 1999, GH)
independent of θ Public goods games Prop. 1
(Ledyard 1995)
Unique SPE Proposal games Increasing in θ Prop. 1
independent of θ (GH Fig. 3 and 4)
Unique mixed Matching pennies Player 2: increasing Prop. 3
equilibrium: (Ochs 1995, GH) Player 1: decreasing
increasing in θ for
player 2, constant
f o rp l a y e r1
Unique Bayesian Auction game (GH) Increasing in θ Prop. 2
Equilibrium
independent of θ
Multiple pure Kreps game (GH) Increasing in θ Prop. 1
equilibria; Extended coordination
mixed equilibrium game (GH)
is independent of θ
Multiple pure Nash Eﬀort coordination Increasing in θ Prop. 1
equilibria where (Van Huyck et al. 1990,
mixed equilibrium is Goeree and Holt 2005)
decreasing in θ Wolf’s dilemma
(Huettel-Lockhead 2000)
Period-2 equilibrium Capacity game Period-2 actions Prop. 1
independent of (Brandts et al. 2003) increasing in own
ﬁrst-period play period-1 action,
decreasing in
opponent’s.
Table 3: Summary of Results
16indirect eﬀects of parameter changes are not mutually reinforcing, so that
general comparative-statics results cannot be derived.
5 C o m p a r i s o nw i t hA l t e r n a t i v eA p p r o a c h e s
Clearly, there are alternative approaches to the issues just raised. First, in
situations with multiple equilibria, selection theories provide similar answers.
Second, for some of the above examples, the quantal response equilibrium
(Mc Kelvey and Palfrey (1995) can be used to explain the comparative statics.
I shall explore the relation of the structural approach to both alternatives.
5.1 Equilibrium Selection
The predictions generated by the structural approach coincide with those
obtained by familiar equilibrium selection theories based on risk-dominance
and potential maximization.
5.1.1 Eﬀort Coordination Games
To show this, I will start with eﬀort coordination games.26 Payoﬀ functions
are
πi (xi,x j;θ)=m i n( xi,x j)+θ · xi,
with xi ∈ {0,1,...,M} and θ = −c for some eﬀort cost parameter c ∈ (0,1).
For c<1, the set of pure-strategy equilibria is the diagonal (given by
x1 = x2). Thus, if one uses the set of pure-strategy equilibria to predict
responses to parameter changes, increases in costs should have no eﬀect on
26Several authors have analyzed the eﬀects of changing various parameters in other 2×2-
coordination games satisfying (SUP) and (ID). For instance, in the experiments of Huettel
and Lockhead (2000), Schmidt et al. (2003), and most of the experiments of Guyer and
Rapoport (1972), the comparative-statics predictions correspond exactly to those obtained
from the Embedding Method, and the arguments are similar as in the following discussion
of eﬀort coordination games. The propositions of this paper are not applicable for the
“Beneﬁt-to-other”-treatment of Guyer and Rapoport, because (ID) does not hold.
17equilibrium eﬀort. The comparative statics become more counter-intuitive if
one allows for mixed-strategy equilibria. For instance, for Xi = {0,1},t h e r e
is an equilibrium such that each player chooses xi =1with probability c.
Thus, as costs increase, agents put more weight on the high eﬀort level, so
that, paradoxically, eﬀort increases with costs. Unsurprisingly, experimental
results (van Huyck et al. 1990; Goeree and Holt 2005) show that for lower c
more subjects choose higher eﬀort.
The structural approach resolves the tension between theoretical predic-
tions and empirical observations. Eﬀort coordination games are supermodu-
lar, because the net beneﬁt from increasing eﬀort is 1 − c>0 if the original
eﬀort level is smaller than the eﬀort of the other player, and −c<0 otherwise.
Thus, the net beneﬁt from increasing eﬀort is non-decreasing in the eﬀort of
the competitor. Also, πi (xi,x j;θ) satisﬁes (ID). Therefore, Proposition 1
predicts that both the smallest and the largest pure-strategy equilibrium are
non-decreasing in θ. This result is compatible with the standard prediction
that the set of pure-strategy equilibria is independent of θ, but also with the
empirical evidence that agents choose higher actions as θ increases.
5.1.2 Risk Dominance and Potential Maximization
The approach just outlined ﬁts nicely with selection criteria such as risk-
dominance (Harsanyi and Selten 1988). In a symmetric 2×2 —g a m ew i t ht w o
pure-strategy equilibria (a,a) and (b,b), (a,a) is risk-dominant if both players
prefer a if they expect the other player to choose a and b with probability
1/2 each. Risk dominance predicts that equilibria with higher eﬀort levels
are chosen as costs decrease (Goeree and Holt 2005). More generally, the
comparative statics implied by Proposition 1 and by risk dominance coincide,
as the following result shows.
Proposition 4 Suppose Xi = {0,1}, and (ID) holds for the standard order
on {0,1}. Suppose that the set of Nash equilibria is {(0,0),(1,1)} for all
θ ∈ Θ.T h e n ,i f(1,1) is selected by risk-dominance for θ
L;i ti sa l s os e l e c t e d
for θ
H ≥ θ
L.
18Proof. See Appendix.
The generalization of risk-dominance to games with more than two players
or continuous actions is not obvious. An alternative approach to equilibrium
selection is available for potential games (Monderer and Shapley 1996, Goeree
and Holt 2005). Such games are characterized by the existence of a potential
V (x1,x 2;θ) with the deﬁning property that π1 (x00
1,x 2;θ) − π1 (x0
1,x 2;θ)=
V (x00
1,x 2;θ) − V (x0
1,x 2;θ) for all x0
1, x00
1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2, θ ∈ Θ, and anal-
ogously for π2.27 Potential-maximizing strategy proﬁles are pure-strategy
equilibria, but the converse is not necessarily true (Monderer and Shapley
1996): In games with multiple equilibria such as eﬀort coordination games,
there is a unique potential-maximizing proﬁle which can be used for equilib-
rium selection. Monderer and Shapley (1996) have already argued that the
observed eﬀects of increasing eﬀort costs can be explained using potential
maximization, showing that, in the experiments of van Huyck et al. (1990),
potential maximization selects the lowest equilibrium for high eﬀort costs and
the highest equilibrium for low eﬀort costs. More generally, potential max-
imization and the structural approach have the same comparative-statics
implications.
Proposition 5 In a symmetric game with diﬀerentiable objective functions
satisfying (ID), suppose
¡
xH,x H¢
and
¡
xL,x L¢
are unique potential maxi-
mizers for θ
H and θ
L (θ
H ≥ θ
L), respectively. Then xL ≤ xH.
Proof. See Appendix.
Summing up, the structural approach yields comparative-statics predic-
tions that are compatible with standard selection methods where they apply.
However, this statement does not extend to payoﬀ dominance. For θ ∈ [−1,1],
t h eg a m ei nT a b l e4s a t i s ﬁes (ID) and (SUP), but the payoﬀ-dominant equi-
librium is (1,1) for θ<0, (0,0) for θ>0, and thus decreasing in θ.
27With continuously diﬀerentiable games, this boils down to the requirement that the
partial derivatives of V with respect to each xi coincide with those of πi (xi,x j;θ).
19x2 =0 x2 =1
x1 =0 0,0 −2 − 2θ,−2+θ
x1 =1 −2+θ,−2 − 2θ −θ,−θ
Table 4: Payoﬀ Dominance versus Structural Approach Game
5.2 Quantal Response Equilibria
The most popular approach to the kind of puzzles described in this paper is
based on the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) introduced by Mc Kelvey
and Palfrey (1995). This equilibrium concept does not presuppose that play-
ers choose best responses to the expected behavior of others. Instead, they
make errors. A QRE requires that each player’s error distribution matches
the assumed distribution determining expected payoﬀ for each choice. The
QRE shares an important property with the structural approach: Unlike
the Nash equilibrium, both theories imply that changes in the magnitude
of incremental payoﬀs can have behavioral eﬀects even when they do not
change the signs of the incremental payoﬀs. Contrary to the structural ap-
proach, however, the QRE speciﬁes a particular story about how and why
agents deviate from equilibrium, which is quite appealing. However, the fact
that the structural approach does not require such a speciﬁc story to predict
comparative statics may also be regarded as an advantage. Several stories
concerning the deviations of agents for any given parameter value can be
told; one example will be provided in Section 6, but it is unnecessary to do
so as long as one is concerned with comparative statics.
An example of the QRE is the logit equilibrium which speciﬁes the choice
probabilities as being proportional to an exponential function of expected
payoﬀs. The logit equilibrium has been used to explain the treatment eﬀects
in the traveler’s dilemma (Anderson et al. 2002, Capra et al. 1999), eﬀort
coordination games (Anderson et al. 2001, 2002) and generalized matching
pennies (Goeree et al. 2003, Mc Kelvey and Palfrey 1995). In some cases, the
20authors provide comparative-statics results for the speciﬁcg a m e . 28 Anderson
et al. (2002) pursue a more general line of reasoning. Like the structural
approach, their Proposition 3 exploits general properties of the game to derive
comparative-statics results. First, the local payoﬀ property requires that the
expected payoﬀ derivative with respect to own actions depends only on one’s
own action, exogenous parameters and the distribution and density of the
other player’s actions. The second property is that, given a distribution of
expected play by the opponent, the marginal expected payoﬀ associated with
an increase in a player’s action is increasing in the parameter. Finally, the
proposition requires symmetry. Thus, there is some similarity between the
result of Anderson et al. and the one mentioned (but not proved) in Section
4.2 that also relies on symmetry and increasing diﬀerences to explain the
observed comparative statics.
Nevertheless, the structural approach oﬀers some additional insights. First,
Propositions 1-3 do not rely on symmetry. This is important because several
of the GH experiments are not symmetric. Second, the local payoﬀ property
is not needed to derive the results. Third, properties such as (SUP), (ID) and
(SC) are expressed directly in terms of the (deterministic) payoﬀs, without
reference to assumptions on the distribution of the other player’s actions.
Finally, and related to these points, the quantal response equilibrium seems
less generally applicable. Instead of using the quantal response equilibrium,
for instance, GH appeal to equity aversion to interpret the proposal games,
a n dt h e yo n l yo ﬀer a heuristic explanation for the Kreps Game.
Summing up, the QRE and the structural approach often lead to the
same comparative-statics predictions because they are based on the same in-
tuition that eﬀects of parameters on payoﬀ diﬀerentials should matter even
when they leave the Nash equilibrium unaﬀected. The theories are comple-
mentary in that the QRE oﬀers a fairly rich but speciﬁc interpretation of the
observations whereas the structural approach is agnostic about the particular
sources of deviation from the Nash equilibrium, thus providing a simpler way
28See, for instance, Anderson et al. (2001) for eﬀort coordination games
21of predicting treatment eﬀects. Because of the similarities between the ap-
proaches, it would be interesting to investigate the relation in more formally.
For instance, one might conjecture that a variant of Proposition 1 holds for
the QRE rather than the Nash equilibrium, but this is beyond the scope of
the present paper.
6 Towards a Behavioral Foundation
In the weak sense of “greater-or-equal”-statements, the aggregate behavior
predicted by the structural approach is typically correct. Why agents behave
in this fashion rather than displaying identical Nash behavior in both cases
has only been discussed intuitively so far. I will suggest two alternative, but
compatible ways to provide a more thorough behavioral foundation of the
observed treatment eﬀects. The ﬁrst suggestion is to assume that players’
choices correspond to the Nash equilibrium in a game with perturbed payoﬀ
functions. The perturbation could come from diﬀerent sources, including, for
instance, social preferences. This approach not only provides weak compar-
ative statics, but also allows for point predictions in principle. The second
suggestion is more radical: For an explanation of treatment eﬀects, it is not
necessary to have a solution concept for any single game at all. Rather, it
suﬃces to start from a simple set of assumptions about how agents react to
a parameter change.
6.1 Nash Equilibria of Perturbed Games
Suppose that, instead of the monetary payoﬀ functions πi (xi,x j;θ),p l a y e r s
have perturbed objective functions
b πi (xi,x j;θ)=πi (xi,x j;θ)+gi (xi,x j;θ). (2)
Suppose that gi (xi,x j;θ) satisﬁes (ID) and (SUP) in (xi,θ).T h e n i f πi
satisﬁes (SUP) and (ID), so does b πi. Thus, even though the Nash equilib-
rium may diﬀer from the equilibrium in the game with payoﬀ functions πi,
22Proposition 1 can still be applied to this game. Thus, the equilibrium is still
non-decreasing in θ.
Importantly, even if gi violates (ID) and (SUP), the comparative statics
are robust unless the violation is so strong that b πi does not satisfy (ID)
and (SUP) anymore. Perturbations can be arbitrary, as long as the basic
structural properties of the game remain unaﬀected. In fact, the perturbation
term need not even be additive.
To illustrate the idea, consider the eﬀort coordination game with Xi =
{0,1}. For suitable perturbations, (ID) and (SUP) still hold, but the equilib-
rium set is (0,0) for low θ and {(0,0),(1,1)} for high θ. Such perturbations
must destroy the symmetric equilibrium (1,1) for some parameters. Thus,
pro-social preferences, which introduce a bias towards symmetric equilibria
cannot do the job. Rather, suppose agents display “anti-social preferences”,
meaning that they gain utility if the other player has exercised useless eﬀort.
Thus, let k>0 and consider the eﬀort coordination game with two eﬀort
levels and perturbation term gi (xi,x j;θ)=kmax(xj − xi,0). The payoﬀ
matrix of the perturbed game is given in Table 5.
x2 =0 x2 =1
x1 =0 0,0 k,θ
x1 =1 θ,k 1+θ,1+θ
Table 5: Payoﬀsi nt h eP e r t u r b e dE ﬀort Coordination Game Game
Suppose k<1. Then the perturbed game still satisﬁes (ID) and (SUP),
and Proposition 1 predicts that the equilibrium set is non-decreasing in θ.
Closer inspection reveals that the equilibrium set depends on θ:F o rh i g hc o s t s
(θ<−(1 − k)), the only equilibrium is (0,0). For low costs (θ>−(1 − k)),
there are multiple equilibria, including (1,1) as well.
Importantly, however, there are many alternative speciﬁcations of the
perturbation that imply the same comparative-statics. Relying exclusively on
the structural approach has the great advantage that it does not presuppose
any particular speciﬁcation of the perturbation terms.
236.2 Adjustment to Change
The structural approach can also be justiﬁed by showing that the same com-
parative statics follow from a set of plausible behavioral rules guiding agents’
adjustments to parameter changes. To this end, I postulate the existence of
a dynamic adjustment process that reﬂects the mental reaction to change.
This adjustment process does not correspond to actual choices made by sub-
jects in a dynamic game, but rather to hypothetic reasoning about one’s
own incentives and those of the competitor. Period 1 of this process cap-
tures the direct eﬀect of the parameter change on both players, abstracting
from the strategic interaction between players. In the remaining periods, I
let the players take these interactions into account. Importantly, to arrive at
comparative-statics conclusions, it is not necessary to refer to any equilibrium
concept for a speciﬁcg a m e .
Consider shifts of θ from θ
L to θ
H,w i t hθ
H ≥ θ
L . Further denote
the resulting adjustment in behavior, that is, the diﬀerence in observed ac-
tions before and after a parameter increase, as a
¡
θ
L ¢
=
¡
a1
¡
θ
L ¢
,a 2
¡
θ
L ¢¢
.
Suppose that ai = limt→∞ at
i, where the “adjustment actions” at
i obey the
following rules:
(ADJ1) Suppose for all xH
i , xL
i ∈ Xi, xj ∈ Xj , θ
L, θ
H ∈ Θ such that xH
i ≥ xL
i
and θ
H ≥ θ
L the following condition holds:
∆i
¡
x
H
i ,x
L
i ;xj;θ
H¢
≥ (≤)∆i
¡
x
H
i ,x
L
i ;xj;θ
L¢
.( 3 )
Then a1
i ≥ (≤)0.
(ADJ2) If πi (xi,x j;θ) is supermodular in (xi,x j) and at
j ≥ 0 for t ≥ 1,t h e n
a
t+1
i ≥ 0.C o n v e r s e l y ,i fat
j ≤ 0 for t ≥ 1,t h e na
t+1
i ≤ 0.
The two behavioral rules are motivated by intuitive arguments used ear-
lier. (ADJ1) captures the immediate response to change. If (3) holds, for
instance, because (ID) is satisﬁed, then the incremental value of increas-
ing the action increases for ﬁxed behavior of the other players. Thus, each
24player’s immediate response to a parameter increase is to increase the own
action weakly. (ADJ2) reﬂects indirect eﬀects: Supermodularity guarantees
that a player i who thinks that the other player has the immediate impulse
to increase his actions following a parameter increase (a1
j ≥ 0) should realize
that the marginal value of increasing an action increases even further, which
is reﬂected by (ADJ2) for t =1 . Also, (ADJ2) for t>1 guarantees that the
entire dynamic adjustment process is monotone increasing when (SUP) and
(ID) hold. The following result is immediate.
Proposition 6 Suppose (SUP) and (ID) hold. Then (a1,a 2) ≥ 0 for any
adjustment process satisfying (ADJ1) and (ADJ2).
Similar results hold under the conditions of Propositions 2 and 3.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
I have introduced the structural approach to derive weak comparative-statics
results for games where the Nash equilibria are independent of parame-
ters, but experimental evidence shows clear treatment eﬀects. The resulting
comparative-statics predictions are supported by the experimental observa-
tions in all cases that I am aware of, in particular, in those analyzed by
GH.
Variations of the approach can be applied to problems that do not concern
comparative-statics directly. For instance, Brandts et al. (2006) consider a
two-stage game of capacity choice. Two players can make costly, but not
fully binding capacity commitments Ci before they decide on investments Ii.
Payoﬀ functions πi (Ii,I j;Ci,C j) are supermodular in (Ii,−Ij) and have in-
creasing diﬀerences in (Ii,I j;Ci,−Cj). The subgame equilibria of the second
stage are independent of the ﬁrst-period choices. Interpreting Ci and Cj as
exogenous parameters of the ensuing subgame, however, Ii should be non-
decreasing in Ci and non-increasing in Cj for j 6= i according to Proposition
1. This prediction turns out to be correct. Thus, the structural approach not
25only yields useful comparative-statics predictions, but it can also be used to
predict the relation between players’ behavior in earlier and later periods.
In spite of the large number of conceivable applications, it is important
to recognize the limitations of the structural approach. First, obviously, the
method does not provide point predictions. Second, even though the ap-
proach applies to a large class of games, there are examples where the direct
and indirect eﬀects of parameter changes are not mutually reinforcing, so
that no comparative-statics predictions are possible without relying on the
concrete speciﬁcation.29 Third, I do not claim that the predictions of the
structural approach are likely to be immune against falsiﬁcation by labora-
tory experiments. To the contrary, I am convinced that cleverly designed
experiments can show that there are some games satisfying (SUP) and (ID)
for which the observed comparative statics violate Proposition 1. The chal-
lenge for future experimental work is to discover under which circumstances
such violations of standard comparative-statics results occur.
8 Appendix: Proofs
The following well-known monotone comparative-statics result will be help-
ful. It is a special case of Topkis (1978).
Lemma 1 Let f ((x,τ) be a real-valued function deﬁned on X × T,w h e r e
X is a compact subset of the real numbers and T is a partially ordered set.
Suppose f satisﬁes increasing diﬀerences with respect to (x,τ).T h e ng(τ) ≡
argmaxx∈X f ((x,τ) is a non-decreasing correspondence.30
In the following applications, X will correspond to the strategy set of one
player; τ will be the strategy set of the other player or the parameter θ.
29For instance, three of the ten little treasures of GH belong to this category.
30g(τ) is non-decreasing if τL <τ H implies ming(τL) ≤ ming(τH) and maxg(τL) ≤
maxg(τH) , where the inequalities on X refer to some arbitrary partial order.
268.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose θ
H >θ
L.N o t e ﬁrst that x1(θ
H) >x 1(θ
L) and x2(θ
H) <x 2(θ
L)
cannot hold simultaneously because reaction functions are non-decreasing
and, by (ID), R2
¡
x1;θ
H¢
≥ R2
¡
x1;θ
L¢
. Similarly, x1(θ
H) <x 1(θ
L) and
x2(θ
H) >x 2(θ
L) cannot hold simultaneously.
Next note that xi(θ
H) <x i(θ
L) for i =1 ,2 is impossible to satisfy.
To see this, note that by (STAB), x1 <x 1(θ
L) and x2 <x 2(θ
L) together
imply that x2 <R 2
¡
x1;θ
L¢
or x1 <R 1
¡
x2;θ
L¢
.B y d e ﬁnition, x2(θ
H)=
R2
¡
x1(θ
H);θ
H¢
and x1(θ
H)=R1
¡
x2(θ
H);θ
H¢
. However, by (ID) and Lemma
1 R2
¡
x1(θ
H);θ
H¢
≥ R2
¡
x1(θ
H);θ
L¢
and R1
¡
x2(θ
H);θ
H¢
≥ R1
¡
x2(θ
H);θ
L¢
,
a contradiction.
Further, suppose that x1(θ
H) <x 1(θ
L), x2(θ
H)=x2(θ
L).T h i s w o u l d
require R1
¡
x2;θ
H¢
and R2
¡
x1;θ
H¢
to intersect to the left of
¡
x1(θ
L),x 2(θ
L)
¢
,
that is for some (x1,x 2) such that x1 <x 1(θ
L) and x2 <x 2(θ
L).T h e r e f o r e ,
R1
¡
x2;θ
L¢
would not be single-valued. Similarly, x1(θ
H)=x1(θ
L), x2(θ
H) <
x2(θ
L) is impossible. Therefore xi(θ
H) ≥ xi(θ
L) for i =1 ,2.
8.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Let
¡
xL
1,x L
2
¢
be the equilibrium for θ
L.B y( S U P
−
2 )a n dL e m m a1t h er e a c -
tion function of player 2 is non-increasing in x1,a n db y( I N D 2), R2
¡
x1;θ
L¢
=
R2
¡
x1;θ
H¢
. Thus, the equilibrium
¡
xH
1 ,x H
2
¢
for θ
H lies on R2
¡
x1;θ
L¢
,i m -
plying
x
H
1 ≤ x
L
1 and x
H
2 ≥ x
L
2 or x
H
1 ≥ x
L
1 and x
H
2 ≤ x
L
2. (4)
It therefore suﬃces to show that xH
1 ≥ xL
1 and xH
2 ≤ xL
2 cannot hold simul-
taneously except if both hold with equality. First, I show that xH
1 >x L
1 and
xH
2 <x L
2 cannot hold simultaneously. Because R2
¡
xH
1 ;θ
H¢
= R2
¡
xH
1 ;θ
L¢
is non-increasing by (SUP
−
2 ), clearly xH
1 >x L
1 implies xH
2 = R2
¡
xH
1 ;θ
H¢
≥
R2
¡
xL
1;θ
H¢
= R2
¡
xL
1;θ
L¢
= xL
2. Next, I exclude the possibility that xH
1 >x L
1
and xH
2 = xL
2. This would require that R2
¡
x1;θ
H¢
= R2
¡
xL
1;θ
H¢
is horizon-
tal to the right of
¡
xL
1,x L
2
¢
; the analogous statement would have to hold for
27R1
¡
x2;θ
H¢
. This would contradict uniqueness of the equilibrium. By similar
reasoning I exclude the possibility that xH
2 <x L
2 and xH
1 = xL
1. Therefore (4)
requires xH
1 ≤ xL
1 and xH
2 ≥ xL
2.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 4
(1,1) is selected by risk-dominance for θ
L if and only if
πi
¡
1,1;θ
L¢
− πi
¡
0,1;θ
L¢
≥ πi
¡
0,0;θ
L¢
− πi
¡
1,0;θ
L¢
.( 5 )
Applying (ID) to both sides of (5) shows that analogous inequalities hold
with θ
L replaced with θ
H,s ot h a t(1,1) is selected by risk-dominance for θ
H.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 5
For xL,x H ∈ X1 = X2,θ∈
©
θ
L,θ
Hª
, V
¡
xL,x L;θ
¢
− V
¡
xH,x H;θ
¢
=
V
¡
xL,x L;θ
¢
− V
¡
xH,x L;θ
¢
+ V
¡
xH,x L;θ
¢
− V
¡
xH,x H;θ
¢
.
Thus, if xL >x H, the deﬁnition of the potential function thus implies
V
¡
x
L,x
L;θ
¢
− V
¡
x
H,x
H;θ
¢
=
π1
¡
x
L,x
L;θ
¢
− π1
¡
x
H,x
L;θ
¢
+ π2
¡
x
L,x
H;θ
¢
− π2
¡
x
H,x
H;θ
¢
.
Using (ID), therefore, for θ
H >θ
L
V
¡
x
L,x
L;θ
H¢
− V
¡
x
H,x
H;θ
H¢
≥ V
¡
x
L,x
L;θ
L¢
− V
¡
x
H,x
H;θ
L¢
.
Further, because xL is the unique maximizer of the potential function for θ
L,
V
¡
x
L,x
L;θ
L¢
− V
¡
x
H,x
H;θ
L¢
> 0.
Taking the last two inequalities together, xH cannot maximize the potential
for θ
H, which contradicts its deﬁnition.
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